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Legal Pluralism as Omnium Gatherum 
Sally Falk Moore*
 I will divide the roughly fifty-year history of legal pluralism into two 
periods: the beginning starting in the 1960s as I experienced it, and the rest 
from the 1970s to the present.  My objective is to try to present a large 
range of situations that have come my way in the literature, and that have 
been called “legal pluralism.”  My emphasis will be on the variety of types 
and some of their historical pasts.  I am contending that some of these 
instances are so unlike each other that while they have been classified 
together as “legal pluralism,” they are not really examples of the same 
social phenomenon.  I am by no means trying to review the whole literature.  
This is a very selective and somewhat accidental account.  A more 
systematic survey of the literature is found in Banakar and Travers’s edited 
book on Law and Social Theory.1
What I want to argue by describing these diverse examples is that it is 
time to reconfigure the way “legal pluralism” is used as a concept.  My 
contention is that “legal pluralism” has become too general a category to be 
analytically useful. 
THE 1960S
I was a guest scholar at U.C.L.A. in the 1960s where there was a very 
active and well-funded African Studies Center.  In the Africanist 
anthropology of the period, there was a great burst of excitement because in 
many countries this was the decade of the end of colonial government.  
African countries were going to be free, at last! 
In 1966, the African Studies Center ran a major colloquium for faculty 
and graduate students.  Its topic was Africa’s future.  There was generous 
funding from the Ford Foundation.  Many distinguished visitors were 
invited from many different countries.  There were a number of African 
student participants.  They were very lively since we were talking about 
their futures.  The issue on the table was what obstacles there might be to 
the institution of government in the newly independent countries.  For the 
*     Appointed Affiliated Professor of International Legal Studies at Harvard Law School, Victor 
S. Thomas Professor of Anthropology Emeritas, Harvard University.  Ph.D. Columbia University, 1957; 
L.L.B. Columbia Law School, 1945; B.A. Barnard College, 1943.  Presented for the “Layers of Law and 
Social Order” symposium held at the Florida International University College of Law on October 24, 
2014.
1  AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY (Reza Banakar & Max Travers, eds., 2002). 
37010-fiu_10-1 Sheet No. 7 Side B      11/13/2015   07:10:42
37010-fiu_10-1 Sheet No. 7 Side B      11/13/2015   07:10:42
C M
Y K
02 - MOORE_FINAL_9.24.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/15 9:18 AM
6 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:5 
discipline of anthropology this was a pivotal moment because, with a few 
exceptions, it had not previously attempted to address the circumstances of 
states. 
Most classical anthropological work up to that period consisted of 
ethnographic studies of particular peoples, paying much less attention to 
the colonial state in which they existed.  The focus had been on the 
description of single African cultures.  There were a few exceptions.  The 
Manchester School was doing studies of urban areas in which people from a 
number of different tribal groups lived together to work in the copper mines 
of Zambia.2  But for the most part ethnographic works concentrated on one 
people at a time.  Considering all the peoples in one nation state and their 
relationship to the central government was a departure for anthropology.  
This had been the realm of political science and sociology.  In the 
colloquium there were scholars from all of these disciplines sharing an 
interest in the problems that new independent governments would face.  
This determined the content of discussion. 
The dominant figure in the colloquium was Professor M.G. Smith, a 
Jamaican who had written a book about pluralism in the West Indies, and 
who had done considerable fieldwork among the Hausa in Nigeria.3  For 
him, there was no doubt that cultural and religious differences would mark 
important lines of segmentation in Africa.  These were going to be the 
terms of political competition in African countries.  There was scarcely any 
country in Africa in which there was a single ethnic group.  The idea that 
there would be national unity under a constitution was an ideal, but there 
were visible ethnic and religious problems built into these societies.  These 
would be the divides that counted. 
What is significant for us here is the theoretical framework that Smith 
used to address the issue of cultural pluralism and nationhood. His basic 
postulate was that in any political field the significant political players were 
corporate groups.  He derived his concept of the social corporation from 
Max Weber, but then developed it further.  A corporation in Smith’s 
definition was a formally organized group.  This could include business 
corporations, but the conception was much wider in its reference.  Smith’s 
argument was that unless political groups were well organized and durable, 
they could not be effective players in the political arena.  They could only 
play in the political scene if their membership was defined, if they had 
2 J.  Clyde Mitchell, The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships Among Urban Africans, 
Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 27, (T.M.S. Evens & Don Handelman, eds., 2006) (Manchester Univ. 
Press, 1956). 
3 See, e.g., MICHAEL G. SMITH, GOVERNMENT IN ZAZZAU 1800-1950 (1960); MICHAEL G.
SMITH, THE PLURAL SOCIETY IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES (1965); MICHAEL G. SMITH, CORPORATIONS
AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1974).
37010-fiu_10-1 Sheet No. 8 Side A      11/13/2015   07:10:42
37010-fiu_10-1 Sheet No. 8 Side A      11/13/2015   07:10:42
C M
Y K
02 - MOORE_FINAL_9.24.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/15 9:18 AM
2014] Legal Pluralism as Omnium Gatherum 7 
established methods of making decisions internally, and if they had ways of 
dealing with the outside world as a unit.  Thus Smith’s way of thinking 
about pluralism and politics was to think of completely distinct groups that 
were internally organized. 
Smith was well aware that this kind of analytic formalism did not 
apply in all situations.  After all, even in the colonial period in Africa ethnic 
groups were not all localized.  Many were scattered and were found on 
various sides of national boundaries.  There were intermarriages.  People 
migrated.  Some went to the cities.  Labor migration was often an economic 
and social necessity for young men in Africa. 
Cultural pluralism was a messier affair than could be represented by 
the corporate concept though it was highly relevant in some places and 
times.  The example of apartheid South Africa weighed heavily on 
discussions in the colloquium.  Smith tried to address this analytic problem 
by inventing terms for different kinds of pluralism: cultural, social and 
structural.  He recognized that there were societies, like the United States, 
in which ethnic, racial and religious differences were not used 
constitutionally to define political units, and others in which such criteria 
were critical definers of groups.  I will not linger on his redefinitions, and 
the analytic problems they raise, except to emphasize that there are multiple 
kinds of pluralism depending on which criterion you use to distinguish 
them. 
Obviously decolonization and cultural pluralism were the key political 
issues being discussed in the U.C.L.A. seminars in the 1960s.  The product 
of the year of meetings and discussions in the African Studies colloquium 
was a book edited by Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith entitled PLURALISM IN 
AFRICA.4  Another U.C.L.A. product of the period was The Journal for 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law.  It came out twice a year and was a 
very modest effort.  However today it is a slick item, with a shiny cover, 
published by Routledge of the Taylor and Francis Group, three times a year. 
What I want to call your attention to is the title of the Journal, The
Journal for Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law.  Here a distinction is being 
made between unofficial law and legal pluralism.  Legal pluralism 
designates multiple forms of official legal order, while unofficial law means 
just that.  But what has happened in the years since the 60s is that the term 
“legal pluralism” has come to refer to both official and unofficial legal 
order, to refer to any multiplicity of normative orders in a given social 
setting, and also to their interaction.  As you will see, I find this merging of 
meanings less than clarifying. 
A major book that further developed the focus on official pluralism 
4  PLURALISM IN AFRICA, BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES (Leo Kuper & M.G.Smith, eds., 1969). 
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came out in 1975.  That book was an important reference work by a legal 
scholar, M.B. Hooker.  Titled LEGAL PLURALISM, its subtitle was, An
Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial Laws.5  It was a compendium of 
laws in British, French, Dutch, and a host of other countries where 
pluralism was present.  For Hooker the condition of legal pluralism 
consisted of more than one legal system in the same polity, a dominant 
system, run by either a colonial or post-colonial government, and the 
subordinate legal systems it recognized.6  The alternative form of legal 
organization would be a unitary system.  Hooker ends his book by stressing 
that newly independent governments would have to choose between the two 
policies, plural or unitary.7
From the 1970s, which I calculate as the beginning of our second 
period, which extends to the present, we see that many governments created 
new constitutions to address this problem.  For example, in Tanzania, where 
in colonial times there had been a system of courts for British residents, and 
a separate system of “Native Courts,” the independent government decreed 
that there would be only one court system for everyone. They opted for a 
unitary system.  The government badly wanted its own authority recognized 
and to be the exclusive authority in the country.  Tanzania wanted to erase 
any political trace of the tribal units which in colonial times had been the 
structures on which indirect rule was based. 
In the new socialist Tanzania, everyone had to belong to the national 
Party, and the administration of the country was organized into decimal 
sub-units of the Party. There were units of ten-house cells at the base, and 
then one hundred cell units, and so on. The big point of this numerical 
calculation was that administrative organization would not be as it had been 
under the British, tribe by tribe, but in a unitary common organization of all 
Party members.  The numerical mode did not recognize tribal distinctions, 
and was designed to help make tribes disappear.  But, of course, this 
decimal organization, while theoretically neutral, erased nothing of the 
underlying social realities of local language, kinship groups and local social 
distinctions which continued to exist though they were not officially 
recognized. 
All the independent governments of Africa had to cope with ethnic 
pluralism in the populations they governed, and they did so in a great 
variety of ways.  The reality of ethnic and religious pluralism remains a 
thorn in the side of many countries.  In many nation-states, whatever their 
official policy, governments find that they cannot divert the population 
5 See generally M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-
COLONIAL LAWS (1975). 
6 See id. 
7 Id. at 479. 
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from strong commitments to their own people and their ambitions as a 
collectivity.
My own fieldwork experience in Tanzania began in 1968.  I chose to 
work on Kilimanjaro where about 700,000 Chagga speaking people lived.8
My plan was to study their legal system.  After some local experience with 
Chagga life, I came to the conclusion that it would be useful to find some 
term that would characterize their persistent ethnic reality despite the super-
imposed socialist government.  I called their situation “a semi-autonomous 
social field,” because while they were formally under government 
jurisdiction, in their relations with each other, they continued to practice 
their own system of customary law informally and privately.9  In an early 
paper when I wrote about this, I also wrote about how such “semi-
autonomous social fields” existed in the U.S. and used a segment of the 
garment industry in New York as a demonstrative instance.10
According to my invented definition, a semi-autonomous social field is 
one to which a body of formal law applies, but which has also generated its 
own enforceable customs and rules.  In the garment industry the people 
involved wanted to continue operating in their own social field without 
using legal institutions, making informal contracts, giving credit, breaking 
formal contracts with the union, and so forth.  In the New York instance it 
was the dress business, and in Tanzania was the ethnic/kinship/
neighborhood complex in which people had lived all their lives.  
Kilimanjaro property (particularly land) was loaned, transferred, inherited, 
and fought about.  Disputes were settled inside families and neighborhoods. 
In both instances, the social fields had their own norms.  Failure to conform 
would mean being ostracized or ejected from the social and economic 
milieu that mattered most. 
This conceptual framework was very soon attacked by John Griffiths, 
an American who was (maybe is) a law professor in the Netherlands. He 
objected on the ground that all enforceable norms should be characterized 
as “law,” that effectively they were sociologically alike, and that there 
should be no distinction between those enforced by the state and those 
enforced by unofficial agencies.11  Griffith’s argument was that by 
recognizing only state enforced norms as “law” and distinguishing the 
norms of semi-autonomous social fields, I had exaggerated the importance 
8 See generally SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND FABRICATIONS: ‘CUSTOMARY’ LAW ON 
KILIMANJARO 1880-1980 (1986). 
9 See id. at 213-319. 
10 Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: the Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 719, 719-46 (1973). 
11  J. Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL LAW 1, 1-56 
(1986).
37010-fiu_10-1 Sheet No. 9 Side B      11/13/2015   07:10:42
37010-fiu_10-1 Sheet No. 9 Side B      11/13/2015   07:10:42
C M
Y K
02 - MOORE_FINAL_9.24.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/15 9:18 AM
10 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:5 
of the state, of the central government.  My sin was that I was engaging in 
“legal centralism.”  He was saying that by distinguishing official law from 
the norms of semi-autonomous social fields, I was over-emphasizing the 
formal system. 
A major paper addressing these questions in the same general era was 
Marc Galanter’s essay entitled Justice in Many Rooms.12  In it he took up 
the role of courts in the United States in order to discuss the much broader 
question of what he called, “indigenous ordering” or indigenous law.13
These were the norms observed outside the courts in everyday activities.  
He says, “the notion of law as a comprehensive monolith—indeed as a 
‘system’—are not descriptions of it, but rather part of its historic ideology.  
Legal regulation in modern societies, as in others, has a more uneven, 
patchwork character.”14  He notes that this has been observed for some 
time.  Among many other works, he mentions the 1963 article of Stewart 
Macaulay observing that in their dealings with each other, businessmen 
often prefer informal verbal agreements to written contracts.  The 
handshake and the smile may often be enough to close a deal.  They avoid 
formal legal arrangements. 
In his article, Galanter alludes to the disdain that legal centralists have 
for such informality, yet that it can be found in many social contexts and 
transactions.  He says, “any major advance in our understanding of how 
official legal regulation works in society depends on knowing more about 
indigenous law and its interaction with official law.”15  He also talks about 
the great burden of work that rests on legal agencies, explaining that they 
have an overload of commitments, more than they can handle. The result, 
he argues, is selective enforcement.16  Galanter goes on to say, “Courts (and 
other official agencies) comprise only one hemisphere of the world of 
regulating and disputing. To understand them we must learn how they 
interact with the other normative orderings that pervade social life.”17  He 
acknowledges, in a less optimistic vein that, “the relation of official and 
indigenous law is variable and problematic.”18  It is precisely this variability 
that should discourage us from finding a single “one size fits all” answer to 
the question what the relationship is between official and indigenous law.  
But variability should give us plenty of settings to investigate and compare. 
12 See generally Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and 
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1-47 (1981). 
13 See id. 
14 Id. at 21. 
15 Id. at 27. 
16 Id. at 33. 
17 Id. at 34.
18 Id. at 25. 
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Instead, many accounts do not strive to arrive at generalizations, but 
address a particular type of situation: the unofficial norms of a closely-knit 
group.  In 1980 an article by David Engel describes the former practices in 
a farming community in the mid-West of the United States.19  There were 
many informal norms among the farmers. They made oral agreements about 
services, sales, and rentals and offered each other mutual assistance when 
needed.  Agreements were not written.  There was a moral code among 
them that, “a farmer’s word is good between farmers,” and they had 
commitments to help one another in all sorts of situations, exchanging 
“information, goods, and equipment” and helping each other with the 
harvest.20  The sanctions for breach were gossip, boycott, and self-help, 
sometimes violence. 
Interestingly enough Engel describes a radical change in these 
internally regulated relationships when the farmers move to town and rent 
their land to strangers.  In dealing with outsiders there was an increase in 
the use of written agreements and some increase in the use of the local 
courts.  However, even then, when there were disputes, negotiated 
settlements were more common than lawsuits.  That was because there was 
general knowledge that if one went to court and the case went to a jury, 
local people would apply local norms. 
In 1991, Robert Ellickson, a Yale law professor, made a very detailed 
examination of the norms governing relationships among neighbors, and 
why they are the way they are.21  He was aiming for a general thesis.  In his 
book, ORDER WITHOUT LAW he argues that close-knit groups “develop and 
maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare 
that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”22  Stated 
more simply, “the hypothesis predicts that members of tight social groups 
will informally encourage each other to engage in cooperative behavior.”23
He undertook to test this hypothesis by studying close neighbors living in 
Shasta County in California.  Some of them were cattle ranchers and some 
were not.  Ellickson examines the law regarding animal trespass, and 
animal-caused damage.24  Some of the areas he in which he was interested 
were open range, while other parts were closed range.  In open range areas 
cattle are not fenced in.  In closed range areas cattle owners are supposed to 
erect fences around the areas in which cattle graze. 
19 See generally David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on 
a Civil Trial Court, 5-3 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 425, 425-54 (1980). 
20 Id. at 438-39. 
21  ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
22 Id. at 167.
23 Id.
24 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 21. 
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Cattle do not read the law and where they are not fenced in, they often 
wander out of their owner’s areas into the land of others, or on to roads 
where they may cause accidents.  There are many legal precedents 
governing these matters, however, the neighbors involved in Shasta County 
were not particularly informed about legal details.  They were most 
interested in maintaining good relations with their neighbors with long term 
ongoing relations in mind. When differences arose, on the whole they 
worked out their problems peacefully.  They cited general norms which all 
of the neighbors held without paying attention to the legal underbrush. 
Ellickson uses this material to criticize a law and economics view of 
behavior, seeing it as always motivated by a calculation of costs and wealth 
maximizing strategies.  He also attacks a version of legal centralism, which 
he attributes to Hobbes, and which implies that law alone governs behavior.  
He also attacks what he calls law and society theory and quotes Arthur Leff 
saying that “law and economics was a desert, and law and society was a 
swamp.”25  Ellickson says “[a] key shortcoming of the law-and-society 
school has been its failure to develop a theory of the content of norms.26
His basic argument is that “law is not central to the maintenance of order” 
and that “the presence of transaction costs is what leads people to ignore 
law in many situations.”27  In trying to develop his own theory of informal 
norms, he reviews a vast literature critically.  His conclusion: “that people 
often choose informal custom over law not only because custom tends to be 
administratively cheaper, but also because the substantive content of 
customary rules is more likely to be welfare maximizing.”28  Ellickson’s 
careful review of other theories ends with what to an anthropologist seems a 
fairly obvious conclusion.  He ends by telling us that there is a likelihood 
that people in close, long term relationships, who have common interests in 
their day to day encounters, are likely to cooperate, and turn to customary 
rules and practices rather than formal authorities and courts.29
After the Griffiths paper that identified me as a legal centralist,30 I did 
not participate further in the argument about categories and definitions.  I 
felt I had had my say.  All of my fieldwork was about non-state actors and 
their occasional resort to official law.  I did not respond to Griffith’s 
argument that all enforceable norms should be termed “law.”  But curiously 
enough the terminological question whether all enforceable norms should 
be treated the same way as law has continued to be discussed.  It continues 
25 Id. at 147. 
26 Id. at 149. 
27 Id. at 280. 
28 Id. at 288. 
29 See id. at 280-86. 
30 See Griffiths, supra note 11, at 20. 
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as a live theoretical issue.  Brian Tamanaha has proposed that the matter 
should be reframed as a question of “normative pluralism.”31  Other 
versions of this theoretical dispute have reappeared a number of times.  For 
example, in 2002 a paper was published by Franz von Benda-Beckmann, in 
which he reviews all the strongly held opinions.32  He wisely observes that 
what people choose to do research on depends on what they are interested 
in, and their theoretical positions follow.33  He comments that legal 
pluralism should be studied in empirical situations and historical processes, 
that there is no point in quarreling about abstract concepts.  He must have 
written the paper in a light-hearted mood because he called it, “Who’s 
Afraid of Legal Pluralism.”34
These theoretical discussions aside, in recent years, the empirical 
examples of legal pluralism in the literature have expanded enormously.  
There is no end of ethnographic descriptions of specific situations. It is now 
understood to be a topic relevant to every country in the world, industrial 
countries as well as developing ones, and some have found it relevant to 
global questions.  In the bulk of the literature there is a tendency for factual
reporting to replace theorizing, but there are still scholars wrestling with 
the theory and the terminology.  There is an obstacle to classification: it is 
the immense variety of circumstances in which these multiple layers of 
order are found. 
I want to briefly describe three settings that are very different from the 
small moral communities approach of Engel and Ellickson, one in Taiwan, 
one in Bolivia, and the third in the global domain.  Jane Winn describes the 
extra-legal ways that small and medium size businesses in Taiwan 
conducted their affairs in the 1990s.35  They had limited access to the 
formal banking system, so they used personal networks and extra-legal 
techniques to obtain funds in the informal economy.  Rotating credit 
associations were one possible resource, provided one had reliable friends 
interested in forming such an association.  Another method was to offer a 
lender a post-dated check.  There was great loss of face, shame and erosion 
of business reputation if one defaulted on paying such a check, so these 
were regularly used in loan agreements.  A third resource in the informal 
economy was to borrow from a moneylender for a short term at a high 
31 FERNANDA PIRIE, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 20 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013) (quoting 
Tamanaha).
32 See generally Franz Von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?,  47 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL LAW 37, 37-82 (2002). 
33 See id. 
34 See generally id. 
35 Jane Kaufman Winn, Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal Financial 
Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 193 (1994). 
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interest rate. Moneylenders had connections with organized crime and could 
easily collect a debt either by sending thugs to the debtor’s home, or even 
merely by threatening to send them. By these means small businesses in 
Taiwan managed to raise money for themselves without going on the 
record, i.e. they raised money for their businesses in a non-taxable way.  
These strategies were what Winn calls “relational practices” which were 
used instead of the formal financial system, and which, incidentally 
“marginalized” the legal system.36  This, then, was a non-legal set of norms 
of operation generally understood by people running small businesses as the 
way things were done.  Winn mentions but refuses to use the term “legal 
pluralism.”37  She thinks it’s more useful just to present her empirical 
observations. 
As for the Bolivian example, I shall give a very short sketch of a paper 
given by Daniel Goldstein that I heard him give a week or two ago.  Its title 
was The Men in Black.38  His case study was of the operation of the huge 
central market in Cochabamba, Bolivia.39  The market has hundreds of 
small stalls, each rented by a merchant.  The state licenses the merchants, 
whose businesses are endangered by two types of illegal activity.  There are 
illegitimate, unlicensed street vendors who carry their merchandise with 
them and set themselves up wherever they can find a spot.  The market is 
also plagued with petty thieves. 
Nevertheless, the merchants have prohibited the federal police from 
coming into the market.  Instead they have outsourced their need for 
protection.40  They have hired teams of black-jacketed tough guys to protect 
them and their merchandise.  Each merchant regularly pays small sums to 
this organization for protection.  The men in black jackets meet every 
morning as a group.  At that time their commander tells them which sector 
of the market each is to patrol for the day.41  The men in black have 
absolute discretion about how to deal with the street vendors and the young 
people stealing.  They can beat them up or do worse.  This is a completely 
extra-legal operation.42  The police know about it but cannot intervene since 
they have been banished by the merchants, and have accepted their ouster. 
This market protection situation is not the small norm-generating 
36 See id. 
37 Id.
38 Daniel M. Goldstein, Invited Lecturer, Remarks at Harvard University, Department of 
Anthropology event: The Exception from Below: Sovereignty and Policing with the Men in Black (Sept. 
22, 2014), in THE OWNERS OF THE SIDEWALK: SECURITY AND SURVIVAL ON THE FRINGES OF THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author). 
39 See id. 
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id. 
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moral community envisaged by Engel and Ellickson.  The market is a very 
large place of business, being protected by a group of people who extort 
money for the protection, but who have the consent and sponsorship of the 
merchants who are supporting them.  It has some of the flavor of a mafia-
type arrangement.  The legal system, in the person of the Federal police, has 
been excluded.43  The municipal police have been given access to work, but 
only on specified limited matters.  For example, they have the right to 
insure that merchants are using the proper weights and measures.  They 
cannot interfere with the men in black who deal with an entirely different 
domain.  This again is a non-legal form of order with its own rules, a non-
legal normative system.  Goldstein calls this an “alternative sovereignty.”44
Would it shed any light on this arrangement to call it legal pluralism? 
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM?
My favorite account of global legal pluralism is by Francis Snyder.  It 
appeared in the EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL in 1999.45  It is about the Barbie 
doll, how she is produced, regulated and sold.  She is labeled “made in 
China” but the reality is more complicated.  China supplies the factory 
space for assembling her parts, provides labor, electricity and cotton cloth 
for her dress.  But Japan supplies the nylon hair.  Saudi Arabia provides oil 
which is refined in Taiwan to make plastic pellets for the body.  Molds 
come from the U.S., Japan or Hong Kong.  The molds are the most 
expensive item in her manufacture.  The U.S. provides cardboard packaging 
and paint pigments.  Banking and insurance come from Hong Kong.  The 
raw materials are delivered to factories in South China who put them all 
together.  Snyder tells us that two Barbie dolls are produced every second 
and sent to forty countries by Mattel, Inc. of El Segundo, California.46
Snyder next takes up some of the legal elements in this picture.  In 
fact, the rest of his paper concerns the tangle of laws, international agencies, 
local negotiations and players in the game, that affect Barbie’s production.  
Among other regulations, the invention, marketing, and production of toys 
is affected by: (1) U.S. intellectual property law, there are copyrights on 
Barbie; (2) by anti-trust law which defines the number of key participants in 
this process, and prevents mergers; and (3) European community 
regulations . . . .  The Council of the European Union legislates on such 
matters as imports and licenses, and has replaced in whole or in part the law 
of member states with European Community Law on such matters.  An 
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See generally Francis Snyder, Governing Economic Globalization: Global Legal Pluralism 
and European Union Law, 5 EUR. L.J. 334, 334-74 (Dec. 1999).
46 Id. at 339. 
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international organization called Toy Industry in Europe now makes rules 
for the European side of these matters.  It is an amalgam of national 
associations of toy producing companies.  However, retailing arrangements 
are concentrated in the U.S., Hong Kong, Europe, and Japan. 
The overarching ruling framework relating to this is the World 
Customs Organization, which has 150 member states.  It is concerned with 
the harmonization of technical customs rules and practices.  It is headed by 
a Council and has a sizeable internal bureaucracy.  It drafts and promotes 
agreements, makes recommendations about the interpretation and 
application of its existing conventions, and acts as a conciliator in disputes 
between contracting parties.  Snyder tells us that the legal status of the 
recommendations of the W.C.O. is “ambiguous.”47  China has only agreed 
to some, not all, of the rules of this World Customs Organization. 
The international commodity chain in toys has many different players, 
many investors, distributors and marketers.  The toy factories in south 
China “often are part of Hong Kong companies.  Production, distribution, 
quasi-political activities such as participation in trade associations, and 
often personal or family relations are closely intertwined.”48  Chinese 
companies produce toys on contract for the world’s biggest toy companies.  
“To the extent that power in the toy chain lies in Asia, it is based in Hong 
Kong,” a place through which more than half of China’s toy production is 
exported.49  Hong Kong courts have heard trademark and copyright cases 
brought by Mattel, the manufacturer of Barbie dolls.  American law on 
these matters is taken to apply in Hong Kong.50
As for labor, all the multinational companies have adopted codes of 
conduct with regard to labor.  But these are not legally binding.  NGOs and 
labor rights groups bring pressure on trade associations to try to get 
conformity, and evidently have some success.  “Codes of conduct . . . are 
analogous to multilaterally negotiated treaties which are then applied as 
standard-form contracts laid down by the leading firms in a particular 
market.”51  But these codes of conduct, though applied contractually, are 
not necessarily observed in practice. 
Toy manufacture is also affected by health considerations.  For 
example, Greenpeace has banned the use of certain chemicals.  There are 
also legal rules about toy safety. 
Other sources of international norms that affect agreements about trade 
47 See id. at 321. 
48 Id. at 322. 
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 Id. at 324. 
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in toys include WTO (World Trade Organization) and GATT (the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).  These affect the commodity chain in 
toys.
After much complex discussion about these various authorities and 
their hierarchical relationship to each other, Snyder produces his 
conclusions.  He tells us that these economic networks, of which Barbie’s 
production is just an example, are a moving scene with many contingent 
elements.  He says that the “economic networks are governed by . . . 
strategically determined, situationally specific, and often episodic 
conjunctions of a multiplicity of” factors.52  He tells us that the relevant 
factors are located at many sites throughout the world, some of them 
institutional, some normative and some processual.  Some of these sites are 
market based; some are established by political structures.  What Snyder 
declares in conclusion is that the totality of these sites represents a new 
global form of legal pluralism. 
I have not done justice to his presentation, but he has certainly made 
the case that there are so many players, so many trade associations, so many 
countries involved, and so many links in the chain of toy production and 
sale, that one can easily see that legal regulation is only one element in the 
assemblage and its activities.  Given the multiplicity of contracts, codes, 
conventions, treaties, and international agreements, there are more ways 
that norms can be established than there are bees in a hive. 
CONCLUSIONS
Snyder’s description of this situation as a new, global form of legal 
pluralism seems a reasonable way to characterize the international 
commerce in toys.  But it is not clear how much that trade has in common 
with the small scale, face to face, community based, normative, non-law 
system, generated by farmers in the Midwest or ranch owners in Shasta 
County.  That kind of community non-law has also been called “legal 
pluralism.” 
The common theme that permeates both the local and the global is the 
fact that these are social fields that have their own unofficial rules.  But 
people in these social fields, despite having their own norms, also operate in 
the presence of laws, which certainly affect them.  Even in the global field, 
without a world government, many of the norms of the global commodity 
chain are generated in law-like formal agreements, documents, treaties, and 
conventions.  Should the complex international toy-producing scene be 
classified with the instances of local community understandings?  Does it 
clarify matters to call them both instances of “legal pluralism?” 
52 See id. at 327.
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Today, as we have seen, the concept of legal pluralism has been 
applied far and wide from colonial structures, to post-colonial ethnic 
“customary” practices, to local systems of relationships among neighbors, 
to lenders and borrowers of money, to merchants buying private protection, 
and to the present global scene.  It was certainly a major advance in legal 
sociology to give full emphasis to the fact that there are many non-state 
normative systems, and to acknowledge how important these systems are to 
the shape of any society.  It was also useful to dispel some of the mythology 
of legal centralism. 
But what comes next?  What about classifying the many situations that 
have been called “legal pluralism” into types.  Those founded on an 
intimate small community might be one sort.  It might even be tempting to 
go further and try to divide the other social settings into a few types.  
Classifying would make things look simpler.  But would we really know 
any more?  Perhaps. 
I want to conclude by pointing out a basic difficulty about trying to 
create a typology.  There is an important reason why we cannot easily 
describe in general terms the relation of non-official norms to official 
systems.  This is because their interaction is not a fixed state of affairs.  It is 
a process, taking place over time.  The official and unofficial are not static 
“systems.”  Official law may be thought of as fixed, but over time, and even 
at one time, as Galanter pointed out, its content or its practical 
implementation can be quite variable.  By definition, the unofficial can also 
undergo variations and transformations.  Changing circumstances redefine 
the modes of operation of people in the social field, fields in which they 
function.  The kinds of relationships their activities create may not be stable 
over time.  So the search for regularities in the formation and content of 
non-legal orders may often be elusive, being temporary, and situationally 
determined. 
The way the term “legal pluralism” is now used is at best a general 
conception of a highly variable process.  It lumps together official forms of 
law with clusters of unofficial rules.  The inquiry into these phenomena 
needs to be refined.  There are important distinctions to be made among the 
kinds of circumstances in which these rule systems operate, and in the 
specifics of these situations.  There is work to be done. 
